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 With the constant pressure to meet consumer demands and the need to be competitive, 
the question of quality is becoming a central point in agro-food chains organization. It is 
well known that quality is dependent upon the characteristics on inputs obtained from 
growers. But the action of the grower in producing a quality product is rarely observed 
by the processor, which generates moral hazard problems. Consequently, once a 
processor decides to acquire his input needs, a difficult question must be resolved. 
Should his input be acquired via contract with growers, or is it more efficient to buy it 
on the spot market?  
The study of vertical relationships has come to be dominated by the principal-agent 
framework in agriculture (Otsuka, Chuma and Hayami, 1992). From this theory, it is 
well known that when measuring grower’s effort is expensive, an incentive share 
contract can be appropriate second best in addressing underlying moral hazard problems 
(Stiglitz, 1974): it provides incentive but only by imposing risk on the grower. Thus, 
trading off the loss from too little incentive against that from too great risk bearing 
defines the optimal share contract (Bell and Zusman, 1976; Stiglitz, 1988).  
In this approach, protecting input quality has been suggested to be a possible 
motivation for the use of contracts over the spot market alternative, especially in the 
presence of imperfect quality measurement (Hueth and Ligon, 1999a,b, 2001, 2002). In 
particular, Wolf, Hueth and Ligon. (2001) conclude that “contracting can be thought of 
as an organizational response to an increased demand for quality among increasingly 
discerning consumers”.  
Many studies of incentive contracts testing principal-agent framework have found 
support for this effect of incentive contracts on quality. Among the existing studies, 
Curtis and McCluskey (2003) analyze a sample of production contracts between potato 
processors and growers in the Columbia Basin area of Washington and Oregon. The 
 authors conclude that contracts are effective at increasing potato load quality over the 
spot market alternative. Carriquiry and Babcock (2004) consider that, in fact, contracts 
are the only way to induce a risk-averse grower to move away from producing a 
commodity to producing a high-value product.  
In a recent paper, Alexander, Goodhue and Rausser (2007) examine an unusual 
dataset 14 tomato growers over 4 years to analyze the effect of incentive contracts on 
behaviour. They find that the processor obtains higher quality tomatoes from 
contracting than from spot purchases because growers respond to price incentives for 
quality.  
Although these contributions have provided empirical support for the prevalence of 
incentive contracts to encourage growers to produce greater level of quality over the no 
contract alternative, it can not be concluded that the processor is better off offering price 
incentives than not contracting. In fact, Alexander, Goodhue and Rausser (2007) outline 
that some of their results suggest that offering those incentive contracts does not 
improve profits. Hence, there would be the possibility that the processor could be not 
acting optimally, as well as the possibility that their analysis would be mistaken on the 
basis of their methodology and data.  
To identify the solution to this problem, the objective of this paper, we develop 
theoretically two models of vertical relationships, the incentive contract and the spot 
market, to implement in the food industry and inspired by previous studies (e.g., 
Stiglitz, 1974; Holmström, 1979; Shavell, 1979). These models analyze the efficiency 
of each mechanism by maximizing the total joint certainty equivalent for all processors 
and producers.  
Most of the theoretical models examined in the previous literature suffer from 
limitations. Although it is well known that agricultural production often presents a 
 trade-off between the quality of a good and the quantity produced, little attention has 
been paid to their role in the principal-agent models. And in the standard vertical-
product-differentiation models in which quantity and quality have been analyzed (for 
example, Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979, 1980; Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983), it is 
implicitly assumed that these variables are independent choices. That is, as any set level 
of quality, a grower is free to produce as much as is desires. But in practice, it is more 
realistic to assume that higher quality comes at the cost of lower yields and vice versa. 
An exception is McCannon (2008), who pioneered a vertical-product-differentiation 
model to analyze the trade-off between the quality of a good and the quantity produced. 
Likewise, market prices are higher for high-quality than for lower quality product, but 
they are inversely related with the total market supply. However, often the models do 
not consider both issues to determine the price market.  Why models have not included 
the previous aspects is likely attributable to analytical problems.   
To fill these gaps, we develop a more general principal-agent model and then we use 
it to analyse the effects of the incentive contract and the spot market on quantity and 
quality.  We generalize the models by considering the effect of the quality-quantity 
trade-off and competition.  
Using this generalized model, we carry out a simulation exercise, and find that the 
study of the competence and the quality-quantity trade-off is fundamental to 
understanding the effects of governance mechanisms. Depending on the characteristics 
of the relationship involved, the incentive contract can provide a greater level of quality 
than the spot market but with a smaller level of efficiency. Hence, it would suggest that 
the actual contracts in use could be not optimal, although they provide greater levels of 
quality than the spot market. That is, processors could be not acting optimally. While 
such a result is apparent in the intuitions underlying many earlier papers (for example, 
 Alexander, Goodhue and Rausser, 2007), we also derive it formally from the optimizing 
behaviour of processors and producers.  
The paper is structured as follows. In the following section, we set up both 
alternative models of governance choice (incentive contract and spot market) using this 
generalized framework. We then carry out a simulation exercise to understand the 
effects of governance mechanism under a wide variety of circumstances. The results of 
this exercise are used to explain many governance choice related issues. In the final 
section of this paper, the linkages between governance structures and agricultural policy 
are discussed.  
 
Models formulation 
An important contractual choice question is: Do incentives for quality ensure 
optimality? Agricultural activities are characterized by a substantial degree of 
uncertainty frequently in the form of hazardous natural environment, price risk and 
quality measurement errors (Hueth & Ligon, 1999a, b). In this context, the deterministic 
profit maximization model is inappropriate and another model should be adopted. A 
widely accepted framework for analyzing decisions making under risk, especially in 
agriculture, is the mean-variance approach (e.g., Myers & Thomson, 1989; Chavas & 
Holt, 1990; Pope & Just, 1991; Coyle, 1992; Andersson, 1995; Gaynor & Gertler, 1995; 
Duvois & Vukina, 2004), which allows concepts of uncertainty and attitude towards 
risk to enter the theoretical framework. To illustrate the proposed methodology, we 
assume that both parties, growers and processors, maximize a constant absolute risk 
aversion (CARA) utility function and the stochastic variables are normally distributed
1.  
The grower and the processor’s behaviour 
   It is assumed that n processors and m growers are symmetrically distributed in 
the village economy. As is it often employed in empirical research in agriculture, 
growers are modelled as risk averse while processors are modelled as neutral risk 
landowners
2 (Allen and Lueck, 1999).  
A quality-differentiated input is produced over a crop cycle which is the period of 
our analysis. The input depends on the effort levels of the grower, who contributes to its 
quantity, q, and quality, s, in terms of production efforts in these variables, x and e 
respectively, according to:  x q =  and  s e s μ = where s μ ∼ s N σ , 1 ( ). Quality uncertainty is 
an increasingly important issue in the agricultural sector (Chambers and King, 2002). 
Randomness of quality is imputable to risky environment and measurements errors. 
Symmetry restriction regarding the quality variance for all growers is also implemented. 
Although the quantity is supposed deterministic, the elimination of this uncertainty only 
implies under-representing the importance of income risk (Fraser, 2001). However, 
since the random variable is multiplicative, grower’s risk premium is also affected by 
quantity.    
There is a cost associated with effort because it is unpleasant and forgoes the 
opportunity to undertake other activities. The standard vertical-product-differentiation 
model assumes that the cost is increasing in both quality and quantity, convex in 
quality, and the marginal cost of production is independent of quality (McCannon, 
2008). To introduce the trade-off between quality and quantity, assume instead that 
()
2
2 , xe c e x C = , with c>0; see Champsaur and Rochet (1989) and Giraud-Héraud, 
Soler and Tanguy, (1999) for examples that have used this cost function.   
 Processors transform the raw material (input) into finished product (ouput). We 
assume that there are not losses of quantity and quality in the transformation process, 
that is, output quantity (Q) and quality (S) are linear functions of the input quantity and 
 quality as follows: Q=q;  S=s. Likewise, we further consider that there are no raw 
material processing costs. Although these unrealistic assumptions are made for the 
purpose of analytical simplification, they do not take away from the applicability and 
implications of the model.  
The price function 
As we noted earlier, there are a total number of m growers (k:1…m) of an input, 
each of whom differentiated in quality. We will denote the quantity and quality 
produced by grower k by qk and sk, respectively. We denote by qik the quantity of 
grower k´s input supplied to processor i, where  . Likewise, there are a total 
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ik and Sk be defined as 
processor i´s output quantity and quality derived from grower k´s input. As there is no 
loss of yield and quality in input processing,  ik ik q Q = , k k s S = . Likewise, let Qi be 
defined as the total processor i´s supply, where . Following Lancaster 
(1979), we distinguish between horizontal and vertical differentiation. Let   denote 
the price at which each processor sells the output derived from the grower i´s raw 
material. An increase in the output quality improves each consumer´s utility (see Mussa 
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3 for the processor i´s output 
derived from grower i´s input is assumed to be linear in his supply, , and quality,  , 
and symmetrically linear in the supplies of the rest of the competitors as follows:  
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Where b1, b2 and b3 represent, respectively, the own market specific quality effect 
(vertical differentiation) and the own and each rival market specific effects (horizontal 
differentiation) with bh>0 h=1…3.  
 We have chosen these specific functional forms for the price and cost functions so 
that the impact of the quality-quantity can be readily observed. On the one hand, the 
price of a product is greater when a higher quality product is made, but it is more costly, 
in total cost and marginal cost. On the other hand, the marginal cost of production is 
assumed to be constant for a given level of quality, but for larger values of the supply 
the price decreases.   
Our formulation of the models
4 implicitly recognizes the law of supply and demand 
for both raw material and finished product, that is, the volume demanded will be 
equivalent to the volume supplied in the regional area.  
 
The Spot Market 
To model the spot market, we consider that n processors (indexed by i:1…n) compete 
on the market for processed products by setting quantities. It is assumed that each 
processor i takes as given the qualities (sk) and prices (pk) of raw materials supplied by 
the m growers (indexed by k:1…m). Moreover, each grower competes on the market for 
raw materials by setting quantities and qualities.   
The model is solved by backward induction. The objective function of the i-th 
processor, assuming that he takes pk and sk as given, is defined in equation 1. The 
processor maximizes his certainty equivalent, , which is equivalent to his expected 




i π ik. A processor´s 
profit is the revenue generated minus the total cost paid:      





k ik ik ik
M
i Q p q P Q CE Max
ik 1
Upon expanding the above expression, the following is obtained:  












































Taking the first-order necessary condition for a maximum in (2) yields:  
(3)                          () ∑∑ ∑
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Aggregation of (3) across the demands for grower k from the processors yields: 














                       
The grower k´s problem for the derived demand (4) is to choose his effort in quality and 








k k k k
M
k e x e x
c







⎛ − Ε =                      
Upon expanding the above expression, the following is obtained:   
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Taking into account that  and maximizing (6) with respect to   and  , a 
system of two equations with two unknowns is obtained:  
k k x q = k x k e
(7a)   () ()
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Since processors and growers face common equations, without loss of generality, in 
what follows we omit the subscript i and k in the variables. Analyzing equation (7a), we 
see an inverse relation between quantity and quality.  
 It can not be obtained a explicitly closed-form solution for the values of x and e 
from the previous equations. Thus, a numerical simulation exercise will be carried out 
as a solution to this model.  
 
The Incentive Contract 
We develop here a generalized moral hazard model for analyzing a general linear 
contract for sharing an uncertain outcome between a processor and a grower. We 
assume that in absence of transaction costs
5 each processor offers each grower an 
individual contract and that the growers choose their efforts levels no cooperatively.  
We do not consider the optimal allocation of land ownership between the growers who 
work with land directly, and their intermediaries who process and sell the growers´ 
output in some downstream market because it does not affect the total joint certainty 
equivalent. 
According to Holmström & Milgrom (1987), when contracting is repeated many 
times and the agent has discretion in actions, the optimal contract offered to each agent 
is linear, consisting of (i) a fixed rent, α, which is independent of the observed outcome, 
and (ii) a share, β, of the observed outcome. Hence, risk-sharing is combined with the 
incentive effect in this contract. A lower output share exposes the grower to less risk 
while a higher share gives him greater incentives to supply his effort adequately.  
We do not consider the optimal allocation of land ownership between the grower 
who works with land directly and his intermediary who processes and sells the growers´ 
output in some downstream market because it does not affect the total join certainty 
equivalent.  
Within this multi-period framework, reputation plays a significant role in 
contractual enforcement. As growers and processors consider long-term relationships, 
 the fear of loss of contracting will prevent them from failing to take actions prescribed 
by the contract (Otsuka, Chuma and Hayami, 1992). 
With regard to the performance indicator, the grower´s contribution to revenue in 
the downstream market will be chosen because it provides a more valuable signal 
regarding the grower´s action than the input quality, which is imperfectly measured 
(Holmström, 1979; Hueth and Ligon, 1999a). This performance measure is frequently 
found in fresh fruits and vegetables (Hueth and Ligon, 2001). Then, the optimal contract 
by processor i offered to grower k is:      
(8)    ik ik ik i ik P Q w β α + =                      
Next, building on prior research by Holmström & Milgrom (1987) we model the 
processor i´s behavior given the growers´ optimal response. The processor i chooses the 
parameters of the linear contract, αik and βik, that maximizes her expected profit net of 
growers´ compensation,  , subject to the constraints that each grower chooses his 
efforts in quantity,  , and quality,  , to maximize his expected utility,  ,  
(incentive constraint) and that each grower attains with each contract at least his 
reservation utility,   (participation constraint). These constraints ensure individual 
and incentive compatibility in form of a Nash equilibrium, where agents choose their 
respective efforts levels individually and no cooperatively.  Then, the maximization 
problem for a representative processor i becomes 
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 The optimization problem in equations (9)-(11) can be solved sequentially. First, the 
optimal solutions to the grower’s decision on efforts in quantity and quality in equation 
(10) are obtained:  
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Optimizing and substituting the values of Qik and E(Sk), we obtain:  
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Here, we should substitute equations (12) and (13) into equations (9) and (11) and 
maximizing with respect to β, the optimal share for the grower would be obtained
6. 
Finally, substituting ,  and  into equation (11), we would obtain the optimal fixed 
rent  .  But similarly than in the previous model, these equations can not be solved 






Simulation and discussion 
As we mentioned earlier, the mean-variance approach has been used to analyze various 
contractual issues. However, it is usually very difficult to explicitly solve the first-order 
conditions that define the values of the decision variables in the optimal contract. 
Quantitative applications of mean-variance models require numerical simulations 
(Robe, 2001).  
Theoretically, growers respond to incentives in contracts obtaining greater levels of 
quality than in the spot market. And in practice, some authors have obtained conclusive 
support empirically (for example, Curtis and McCluskey 2003, Alexander, Goodhue 
 and Rausser, 2007). However, given the trade off, often present, between the quality of 
a good and the quality produced, it can not be assumed that a greater level of quality 
always lead to a greater level of expected profit.  
In this section we undertake some comparative statics in order to see how changes 
in the number of operators, uncertainty and/or grower´s risk aversion can explain that 
the processor could be not acting optimally with an incentive contract. Our models 
allow two sets of results. First, there are implications about the consequences of 
contractual choice in grower´s decision variables. Second, the models developed above 
are used to show the optimality of these contractual mechanisms.  
We carry out a simulation exercise with a wide range of scenarios, and selected the 
examples below as being representative of the behaviour we found. We use 
Mathematica
7 to solve the model, and use Excel to draw the graphs using the data 
produced by Mathematica. We initially choose the following parameters:  1 1 = b , 
,   and  00001 . 0 2 = b 0001 . 0 3 = b 4 . 0 = c . It should be noted that these initial values are 
used for convenience and has no special significance here and that simulation results do 
not change substantially if different values for b1, b2, b3 and c are used.  
It will be seen below that this exercise is able to provide a consistent explanation for 
many issues relating to governance mechanisms. However, before proceeding, we 
should note the caveat that this simulation exercise uses restrictive assumptions about 
the shapes of price and cost functions. Although these seem highly plausible to us for 
most situations, there may be situations which are not covered by our simulations. 
Then, we have three free parameters in our model: the number of growers, n, the 
number of processors, m, the primary producer’s coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion,ρ , and the variance of input quality, . It may be worth noting here that the 
risk premium can be higher for a grower than for another either because he is more risk 
2
s σ
 averse or because he faces higher variance in his income. Hence, these latter two 
parameters can be jointly identified, , as both act on the producer’s risk premium in 
a similar way.  
2
s ρσ
  For the purposes of the simulation, we consider an identical number of processors 
and growers, varying from 1 to 40, in steps of 5. Likewise, we assume that    to take 
values 0, 0.000001, 0.00001 and 0.0001
2
s ρσ
8. Still larger values for   do not 
substantially affect the results of simulation exercise reported in this section. Using the 
equations explained in the models, we calculate the grower’s effort in quantity in each 
contractual mechanism for each of possible combinations, which is illustrated in Figure 
1. This process has been repeated for the grower’s effort in quality and the total certain 

























































  Incentive Contract Market 
Figure 1. Comparing grower’s effort in quantity with incentive contract and spot market 
 Figure 1 shows that the effect of the spot market on quantity is only greater than that of 
the incidence contract in sceneries characterized by relevant competition and low levels of 
growers´ risk premium. On the contrary, in situations with imperfect competition the 
contract is more likely to provide incentive for growers to provide a level of quantity higher 
than of the spot market. In particular, for an important level of risk premium, independent 
from the number of operators, the quantity obtained with the incentive contract is greater 
than that obtained with spot market. 
 Figure 2 shows the values of quality for both mechanisms for all values of risk 



















































Incentive Contract Market 
  
Figure 2. Comparing grower’s effort in quality with incentive contract and spot market 
 Figure 2 shows that in absence of grower´s risk premium, the spot market obtains an 
effort in quality greater than that of the incentive contract, with the exception of 
successive monopoly (n=m=1), in which the level of quality is similar in both 
mechanisms. As the grower´s risk premium increases, the level of quality in both 
mechanisms decreases, being this effect much more intense in the spot market than in 
the incentive contract. This result would support the role of risk-sharing inherent in the 
incentive contract suggested by some authors (for example, Newberry, 1977; Newberry 
and Stiglitz, 1979). Hence, as the grower´s risk premium increases, the incentive 
contract is more likely to provide greater levels of quality than the spot market.  
It may seem contradictory that with a few operators, the spot market obtains a 
greater level of quality than the incentive contract for all the values of risk premium 
considered in this simulation. However, it can be explained with the trade-off between 
quantity and quality. With high levels of grower’s risk premium and small number of 
operators, the spot market obtains a very low level of quantity(see figure 1). Given the 
inverse relation between quantity and quality, the level of quality is relevant in 
comparison with that of the incentive contract.  
Finally, in the Figure 3 we have evaluated the total certain equivalent for all values 























































Incentive Contract Market 
Figure 3. Comparing total certain equivalent with incentive contract and spot market 
 
Observing the figure 3 we see the processors may be either better off or worse off 
using the incentive contract compared to the spot market depending on the 
characteristics of the relationship involved. As agency theory predicts, an increase in the 
magnitude of grower´s risk premium increases the appealing of the incentive contract 
while decreasing the appealing of the spot market, considering the total certain 
equivalent (see figure 3).   
In the first best world with risk-neutral agents and/or absence of uncertainty 
( =0), the incentive contract is rarely efficient, only when the number of operators is 
reduced, nearly successive monopoly. However, in the second best world with risk-
averse growers, the spot market becomes less attractive due to the high risk premium 
supported by the growers in this mechanism.  
2
s ρσ
Then, as grower´s risk premium (i.e. risk aversion or output variance) increases, 
relative preference for incentive contract is likely to increase over spot market. This 
result is supported by other studies, for example Cheung (1969), Bardhan (1984) and 
Parthasarthy and Prasad (1974).  
Comparing the three figures, we can see cases in which the incentive contract 
provides a smaller level of quality but a greater level of total certain equivalent than the 
 spot market (see for example, n=m<5 and  =0.00001). Hence, it can be not 
concluded that the governance mechanism that provides a greater level of quality is the 
optimal mechanism considering the total certain equivalent.  
2
s ρσ
Likewise, there are situations in which not only does the spot market provides a 
greater level of quality, but also a greater total certain equivalent than the incentive 
contract (for example in absence of uncertainty,  =0). This result would suggest that 
the spot market could be preferred over the incentive contract under several conditions.   
2
s ρσ
Taken together, processors should choose the governance mechanism that 
maximizes their wealth, not product yield or quality properties. The reason is that it can 
be concluded that neither a greater level of quality always leads to a greater level of 
total certain equivalent nor the incentive contract is always more efficient than the spot 
market.     
This simulation exercise could also provide a consistent explanation for some results 
obtained by Alexander, Goodhue and Rausser (2007). They can not conclude that the 
benefit of higher quality outweighs the costs of providing the price incentives for the 
processor. Although the offer of these incentives by the processor might appear to be 
prima facie evidence that the processor increases profits by offering price incentives for 
quality, the results of their analysis do not completely support this inference.  
 
Conclusions 
The use of contracts to induce growers to provide desired quality attributes has 
become common practice in many agricultural sectors. To solve the apparent 
asymmetric information problems between processors and independent growers that 
universally plague these relationships, the majority of contract use high-powered 
incentives schemes to compensate growers (Curtis and McCluskey, 2003; Dubois and 
 Vukina, 2004; Alexander Goodhue and Rausser, 2007). While economists have shown 
increased interest in the effects on quality of these contracts, surprisingly little attention 
has been paid to the question whether processors are acting optimally.  
To fill this gap, we have developed and applied a model of contractual choice in 
agriculture by analysing the optimality of the incentive contract and the spot market in 
the framework of a generalized moral hazard model, considering the quantity-quality 
trade-off and competition.  
Specifically, there is a trade-off between yield and quality of many agrarian inputs; 
higher quality comes at the cost of lower yields and vice versa. Likewise, market prices 
are higher for high-quality than for lower quality products, but exact price levels are 
determined by market factors such as the relative supply for each good. Thus, prices and 
yields appear to be inversely related in the aggregated market. However, the literature 
on contractual choice has long dealt separately with quality and yield probably because 
they are inaccessible to solve analytically.  
Our analysis illustrates the effects of the incentive contract and spot market on 
product properties, quality and quantity, on the basis of a simulation exercise. In 
particular, we analyzed a plausible range of number of operators (growers and 
processors) and risk premium and carried out a simulation exercise to understand the 
effects of each mechanism under a wide variety of circumstances.  
The exercise throws some light on the relative importance of analysing the 
quantity/quality trade-off and competition in the analysis of the optimality in 
governance choice. We can not conclude from our results that the mechanism that 
provides a greater level of quality is the most efficient mechanism. Likewise, we can not 
conclude that the processor is always better off offering incentive contracts than trading 
in the spot market.   
 On balance, the models developed here provide a satisfactory explanation of why 
processors should choose the mechanism that maximizes their wealth and not the levels 
of quality. It could explain some of the results obtained by Alexander Goodhue and 
Rausser.  (2007), which suggested that offering price incentives does not improve 
processors´ profits. 
The simulation exercise presented here leaves unanswered many interesting 
questions in contracting. One important aspect of the problem, which we have not 
considered, is that many contracts are based on monitoring. We assumed that the 
processor can not directly observe grower’s effort or infer it form knowledge of the 
output. However, by monitoring him, they can obtain a reasonable estimate of the 
grower’s effort level, and thereby dissuade him from shirking. Some monitoring of 
growers is often undertaken by processors (Agrawal, 1999).    
This paper provides some interesting implications from an agricultural policy 
perspective.  
It is obvious that each grower faces a trade-off between offering high levels of 
quantity (and low quality) versus high levels quality (and low yield) of his agricultural 
inputs. Since these attributes are assumed to have an influence on the price received by 
the growers, the optimal choice is obviously contingent upon the relationship between 
the quantity/quality trade-off and the received price.      
In the event that agricultural policy is geared towards increasing the quality in the 
agrarian markets, the policy makers could strive to incentive growers to produce quality 
by regulating the specified maximum yield per acre. However, the situation is 
complicated by the fact that in order to induce growers to produce quality, they must be 
offered a compensation for the increase in cost associated with it. And if this 
compensation for cost increases is not associated with higher spot prices, it is difficult 
 that growers can receive it. The alternative, and more realistic, strategy for growers and 
processors is to think how to make that consumers perceive the quality and are willing 
to pay more for it. Creating a Quality Certified Brand could be a possibility given that it 
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1 The optimal choice for a decision maker faced with uncertainty is the maximization of his expected 
utility where the expected profit and variance are the arguments of utility. As the expected utility derived 
from variable profits is equal to the utility derived from the certainty equivalent, CE, the maximization 
problem can be mathematically written as  ( ) , where the coefficient ( 2
2
π ρσ π − = E CE ρ ≥0) measures 
the risk aversion and σ
2
π  is the variance of profit (Robison & Barry, 1987).  
2 A reason for this assumption is that the cost of bearing risk is generally relatively less for the processor 
than for the grower (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).  
3 Linear demand systems have been used extensively in models of oligopolies, see (Coughlan, 1985; 
McGuire & Staelin, 1983; Jaumandreu & Lorences, 2002).   
4 From now on, the superscripts M and IC will indicate the mechanism associated, that is,  spot market 
and incentive contract respectively.  
5 The assumption of absence of transaction costs is restrictive in the sense that the transaction costs of 
offering contracts are never zero in practice, and offering individualized contracts will generate higher 
transaction costs, However, the reason for this restrictiveness is to concentrate on competitive motivations 
instead.  
6 Let the Nash equilibrium values be denoted as *.  
7 The Mathematica commands are available from the authors on request. 
8 With  =0.0001 the value of the certainty equivalent per processor is very small.  
2
s ρσ
 